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HANDLE VIA TALENT/
KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM

Copy No. ⁴⁸ of 77
TCS# 042-68/2

Memorandum for Holders
USIB-D-46.7/6
12 August 1968
Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-46.7/6

SUBJECT : Release of TDI Targeting Data Derived from
TALENT-KEYHOLE, [REDACTED]

25X1A

REFERENCE : USIB-D-46.7/6 (COMIREX-D-2.11/17),
29 July 1968

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1. At the request of the Chairman, in restricted session at the 8 August USIB meeting [REDACTED] explained that he was reluctant to have this item come before the Board but after months of deliberation in COMIREX it was concluded that there were considerations that the Committee was not able to handle. [REDACTED] then briefly outlined the Conclusions reached by his Committee and emphasized that, based on the small amount of T-KH involved, there was only a very small security risk involved in this release of Target Data to [REDACTED]

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2. Admiral Taylor said that CIA had raised the question of security risk since approximately 73 of the targets involved in this release were in China and included a fair number of rail and road bridges. He said that with this many in China and the specificity of information on the loading and capacity of these bridges anyone would conclude that the source of such information could only be obtained by overhead photography. In addition Admiral Taylor said that the attitude [REDACTED] indicated they were not inclined to participate in [REDACTED] operations. Moreover, he noted

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
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3. Admiral Lowrance said that he thought that proper sanitization procedures had been followed and that neither he nor General Carroll could see much of a security risk involved in the release. He said it seemed to him to be more of a policy matter and that DIA would not be worried if State was satisfied. Admiral Lowrance thought a look at these targets would not tell too much about the source. Admiral Taylor noted that the Chairman of COMIREX held a similar view. Admiral Taylor however found it hard to see how anyone could believe that we could get such detailed information on targets deep in China except by overhead reconnaissance photography. [] pointed out that a lot of this overhead reconnaissance could have been U-2 photography and other detail could also be the result of computation of information from non-photographic sources, rather than from KH photography.

4. Mr. Hughes asked if the members were primarily concerned with security or policy considerations. Admiral Taylor said that he considered the main problem to be protection of T/KH information but that he was also worried by policy considerations. Mr. Hughes agreed, explaining that State was troubled by the release policy which was complicated []

[] He noted that CIA had not raised the security question during the last National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) discussion and suggested that such action may be appropriate in the case of []

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25X1A 5. Admiral Taylor said that we must assume that TDI information previously released to [] has been passed to China. In answer to Mr. Hughes' question as to what China would gain from the information in the new target list compared with the previous [] list, Admiral Taylor said that by comparing the lists the Chinese would know what we consider important and what areas have now been targeted.

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25X1A 6. Admiral Taylor commented that the CIA member of NDPC had told him that while no formal decision was made, it was the general consensus of NDPC that it would be politically undesirable to make any obvious changes in present disclosure to [] but, on the other hand, would be equally undesirable to initiate any additional categories of disclosure. Mr. Hughes said that his record showed that the NDPC desired that releases [] be continued as at present. He noted however that the Committee had last met in July before it had seen the report

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25X6 7. Mr. Hughes suggested that with such confusion it might be well for the Board to hold over this item for reconsideration at a later date. Meanwhile, he thought perhaps the NDPC could have another meeting since the continued presence [] raised a fundamental policy question. Admiral Taylor believed that NDPC should be asked to take a formal position on this question. Admiral Lowrance agreed with this item being held over in order to give him more time to study the larger problems involved.

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25X1A 9. The USIB then agreed that this subject of the release of target data to [] should be deferred for reconsideration by the Board at a later date, after the NDPC had completed a review of disclosure policies with respect to [] Mr. Hughes stated that he would bring this matter to the attention of the Chairman of NDPC, and Admiral Taylor said he would also ask the CIA representative on NDPC to raise this question with that Committee.

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